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1. Introduction and Preliminaries
In a society, suppose that a project team must decide a distribution of profits among the
members of the team. Affected by social, economic and ethical situations, on one occasion
it may adopt one criterion for distribution, and on another occasion, it may adopt another.
In this society, on average, with some probability, each criterion is adopted. Translating this
situation into statements in cooperative games (transferable utility games, or TU games), on
one occasion, one solution is adopted and on another occasion, another solution is adopted.
In this note, we consider two solutions in TU games, that is, the Shapley value and the
(pre-)nucleolus. We imagine a society where with some probability (say, $1-\alpha$), the Shapley
value is adopted as a distribution of profits and with the remaining probability $(\alpha)$ , the
prenucleolus is adopted. A way for defining an intermediate solution is simply to make a
convex combination of the Shapley value with the prenucleolus. However, we do define in
another way.
In TU games, the excess of each coalition to some payoff vector is defined as an expression
of dissatisfaction of this coalition to that vector. The (pre-)nucleolus is defined by using
excesses for all coalitions. In this note, first we try to define the Shapley value alternatively
by using averages of excesses (Theorem 1). We make a quantity ( $h$-excess) after we combine
usual excesses with these averages of excesses. Then we define an intermediate solution by
using $h$-excesses. This solution exists for every game and consists of one point (Theorem 2).
The purpose of this note is to give a bridge between two single-valued solutions, that is,
the Shapley value and the (pre-)nucleolus. In this note, we call this solution $h$ -prenucleolus,
for the sake of convenience, because the definition of it is similar to that of the nucleolus.
Alternatively we could call this an extended Shapley value. It is a problem to define this
solution alternatively by using incremental contributions $v(S)-v(S\backslash \{i\}),S\subseteq N,i\in S$ . Also
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we may define another intermediate solution (say, an extended Shapley value) by combining
the Shapley value with the (pre-)nucleolus, via incremental contributions.
A (cooperative) game (with side payments) is a pair $(N,v))$ where $N=\{1, \ldots,n\}$ is a
finite set of players and $v$ is a real-valued function defined on $2^{N}$ with $v(\emptyset)=0$ , called the
characteristic-function of the game. An element of $2^{N}$ is called a coalition. We let $\Sigma^{0}\equiv$
$2^{N}\backslash \{\emptyset,N\}$ . For any set $z,$ $|Z|$ denotes the cardinality of $z$ . For a coalition $S,$ $R^{S}$ is the $|S|-$
dimensional product space $R^{|S|}$ with coordinates indexed by players in $S$ . The i-th component
of $x\in R^{S}$ is denoted by $x_{i}$ . For $S\subseteq T\subseteq N$ and $x\in R^{T},$ $x|S$ means the projection of $x$ to $R^{S}$ .
For $x\in R^{N}$ , we let $x(S)= \sum_{i\in \mathit{3}}x_{i}$ (if $S\neq\emptyset$), and $x(\emptyset)=0$ . A pre-imputation for a game $v$ is a
vector $x\in R^{N}$ that satisfies
$x(N)=v(N)$ . (1)
$X^{*}(v)$ is the set of all pre-imputations. A function $\phi$ which associates a set $\phi(v)\subseteq X^{*}(v)$ to
every game $v$ is called a solution. When $\phi(v)$ consists of one element, we call the unique






For a game $v$ , a pre-imputation $x\in X^{*}(v)$ , and $S\in\Sigma^{0}$ , the quantity $e(S,x)=e(S,x,v)\equiv$
$v(S)-x(S)$ is called the excess of $S$ at $x$ , which is considered as an expression of dissatisfaction
of $S$ to $x$ . Let $X\subseteq R^{N}$ , and let $H=(h_{i})_{i\in D}$ be a finite sequence of real-valued functions defined
on $x$ . Let $d=|D|$ . For $x\in X$ , let $\theta(x)=(\theta^{1}(x), \ldots,\theta^{d}(x))$ be the vector in $R^{d}$ whose components
are the numbers $(h_{i}(x))_{\mathrm{i}\in D}$ arranged in non-increasing order, that is,
$\theta$ : $Xarrow R^{d},$ $\theta^{\mathrm{t}}(x)=\max\min_{T\subseteq D,|T|=t|\in T}h_{i}(x),\forall t=1,$ $\ldots,$ $d$ .
Let $\geq\iota_{ex}$ denote the lexicographical ordering of $R^{d}$ ; that is, $x\geq\iota_{ex}y$ , where $x,y\in R^{d}$ , if either
$x=y$ or there is $1\leq t\leq d$ such that $x^{j}=y^{j}$ for $1\leq j<t$ and $x^{t}>y^{t}$ .
Definition. The nucleolus of $H$ with respect to $X$ is defined by
$N(H,X)=\{x\in X|\theta(y)\geq_{\mathrm{t}ex}\theta(x),\forall y\in X\}$ .
Definition. Let $(N,v)$ be a game, let $X\subseteq R^{N}$ , and let
$H=(e(S,.,v))_{S\in 2^{N}}$ .
$N(H,X)$ is the nucleolus of $(N,v)$ with respect to $X$ and denoted by $N(N,v,X)$ . When $X=$
$I(N,v)$ , it is called the nucleolus of $(N,v)$ and denoted by $N(N,v)$ . When $X=X^{*}(N,v)$ , it is
called the prenucleolus of $(N,v)$ and denoted by $\mathcal{P}N(N,v)$ .
2. The Shapley Value
In this section we express the Shapley value as a solution of a linear programming problem.
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$(P)$ $\sum_{S\cdot i\in S,S\neq N}\gamma_{n-1}(S)e(S,x)\leq K$ , $\forall i\in N$ ,
$x(N)=v(N)$ .
The minimum value of this problem $(P)$ is
$K^{*}= \sum_{s\neq N}\frac{|S|}{n-|S|}\gamma_{n}(S)v(S)-\frac{v(N)}{n}\sum_{s=1}^{n-1}\frac{s}{n-s}$.
Lemma 1A. A pre-imputation $x\in X^{*}(v)$ is the Shapley value if and only if
$s: \sum_{;\in S}\gamma_{n}(S)\{e(S,x)-e(S\backslash \{i\},x)\}=0,\forall i\in N$. (2)
Proof: If $x\in X^{\cdot}(v)$ is the Shapley value, by definition we have
$x_{i}= \sum_{S::\in S}\gamma_{n}(S)\{v(S)-v(S\backslash \{i\})\},\forall i\in N.$ (3)
For every $T\subseteq N,$ $v(T)=e(T,x)+x(T)$ . Rom this and (3), we have
$x_{i}= \sum_{S:i\in S}\gamma_{n}(S)\{e(S,x)-e(S\backslash \{i\},x)+x_{i}\},\forall i\in N$ . (4)
Noting $\sum_{S:i\in s}\gamma_{n}(S)=1,\forall i\in N$ , we have the relation (2).
Conversely if $x\in X^{*}(v)$ satisfies (2), it satisfies (4), which implies $x$ is the Shapley value.
$\square$
Lemma 1B. For a game $v$ , let $x\in X^{*}(v)$ . $x$ is the Shapley value, that is, $x=\varphi(v)$ if and only
if
$\sum_{S:\mathfrak{i}\in S,j\not\in s}\gamma_{n-1}(S)e(S,x)=\sum_{S:j\in S,i\not\in s}\gamma_{n-1}(S)e(S,x),\forall i,j\in N,i\neq j$
. (5)
Proof: Let $x\in X^{*}(v)$ be the Shapley value. By Lemma 1A,
$\sum_{S:i\in S}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S,x)=\sum_{S.i\in S}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S\backslash \{i\},x)$. (6)
The left hand side of (6) becomes
$\sum_{S:i\in s}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S,x)=\sum_{S:i\in S,j\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S,x)+\sum_{S:i,j\in s}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S,x)$. (7)
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The right hand side of (6) becomes
$\sum_{S.i\in s}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S\backslash \{i\},x)=\sum_{Si\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S\cup\{i\})e(S,x)$
(8)
$= \sum_{S.j\in S,i\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S\cup\{i\})e(S,x)+\sum_{S:j\not\in S.i\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S\cup\{i\})e(S,x)$
.
From (6) $-(8)$ ,
$\sum_{S.i\in S,j\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S,x)+\sum_{S:i.j\in s}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S,x)=\sum_{S:j\in S,i\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S\cup\{i\})e(S,x)+\sum_{s:j\not\in S,i\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S\cup\{i\})e(S,x)$
. $(9)$
Replacing $i$ with $j$ and $j$ with $i$ , we have
$\sum_{S:j\in S,i\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S,x)+\sum_{s:i,j\in S}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S,x)=\sum_{S:i\in S,j\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S\cup\{j\})e(S,x)+\sum_{s:i\not\in S,j\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S\cup\{j\})e(S,x)$
. (10)
Noting $\gamma_{n}(S\cup\{i\})=\gamma_{n}(S\cup\{j\})$ , from (9) and (10),
$\sum_{s:i\in S,j\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S,x)-\sum_{S:j\in S,i\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S,x)=\sum_{S:j\in S,i\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S\cup\{i\})e(S,x)-\sum_{s:\cdot\in S,j\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S\cup\{j\})e(S,x)$
.
(11)
Noting $\gamma_{n}(S)+\gamma_{n}(S\mathrm{U}\{i\})=\gamma_{n-1}(S)$ , we have the relation (5).
Conversely if the relation (5) holds, then the relation (11) holds, which implies
$\sum_{S::\in S}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S,x)-\sum_{Sj\in S}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S,x)$
$= \sum_{s:i\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S\cup\{i\})e(S,x)-\sum_{s:j\not\in s}\gamma_{n}(S\cup\{j\})e(S,x)$
$= \sum_{S:i\in S}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S\backslash \{i\},x)-\sum_{S\cdot j\in S}\gamma_{n}(S)e(S\backslash \{j\},x)$
.
Hence
$\sum_{S:i\in s}\gamma_{n}(S)\{e(S,x)-e(S\backslash \{i\},x)\}=\sum_{S:j\in s}\gamma_{n}(S)\{e(S,x)-e(S\backslash \{j\},x)\}$
.
That is,




Adding for all $i\in N$ , we have
$n \alpha=\sum_{\iota\in N}\{\phi_{i}(v)-x_{i}\}=v(N)-v(N)=0$ .
Hence $\alpha=0$ , which means $x=\varphi(v)$ . $\square$
Lemma 1C. For a game $v,1\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}x\in X^{*}(v)$ . $x$ is the Shapley value, that is, $x=\varphi(v)$ if and only
if
$\sum_{S\cdot i\in S,S\neq N}\gamma_{n-1}(S)e(S,x)=\sum_{S.j\in S.S\neq N}\gamma_{n-1}(S)e(S,x),\forall i,j,i\neq j$
. (12)
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Proof: The relation (12) is obtained by adding
$\sum_{i,j\in S,S\neq N}\gamma_{n-1}(S)e(S,x)$
to both sides of the relation (5).
Proof of the theorem:
$\sum_{S:i\in s,s\neq N}\gamma_{n-1}(S)x(S)=x_{i}\sum_{S:i\in s,s\neq N}\gamma_{n-1}(S)+\sum_{j\neq \mathfrak{i}}x_{j}\sum_{S:i,j\in s,s\neq N}\gamma_{n-1}(S)$










From this and the inequality constraint of the problem $(P)$ ,
$nK \geq.\cdot\sum_{\in N}\sum_{S:i\in S,S\neq N}\gamma_{n-1}(S)e(S,x)=nK^{*}$ .
Hence $K\geq K^{*}$ . If $x$ is the Shapley value, by Lemma $1\mathrm{C}$ , we can let
$L \equiv\sum_{S:i\in S,S\neq N}\gamma_{n-1}(S)e(S,x)$
for all $i\in N$ . From this and (13) we have $nL=nK^{*}$ , or $L=K$“, which means that the Shapley
value is an optimal solution for the problem $(P)$ . Next suppose $y\in X^{*}(v)$ is an optimal
solution. Then
$\sum_{S:i\in S,S\neq N}\gamma_{n-1}(S)e(S,y)\leq K^{*},\forall i\in N$ .
Adding these together, we have $nK^{*}\leq nK^{*}$ by (13). Hence
$\sum_{S::\epsilon s,s\neq N}\gamma_{n-1}(S)e(S,y)=K^{*},\forall i\in N$.
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From this and Lemma 1C, $y$ is the Shapley value.





Adding the first three inequalities and using the efficiency, we get
$K \geq K^{*}\equiv\frac{v(1)+v(2)+v(3)-5v(N)}{6}+\frac{v(12)+v(13)+v(23)}{3}$ .
When $K=K^{*}$ , we see $x_{i}\geq\phi_{i}(v)$ for all $i\in N$ . From this and the last equality constraint, we
have $x_{i}=\phi_{i}(v)$ for all $i\in N$ .
Remark. (Sobolev 1975, $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{g}/\mathrm{S}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ 2003,pp.2l8-224) For a game $v$ and $x\in X(v)$ ,
define a game $(N\backslash \{n\},w)$ by
$w(T)=\{$
$x(N\backslash \{n\})$ , if $T=N\backslash \{n\}$ ;
$\frac{n-1-|T|}{n-1}v(T)+\frac{|T|}{n-1}\{v(T\cup\{n\})-x_{n}\}$, if $T\neq N\backslash \{n\},$ $T\neq\emptyset$ ;
$0$ , if $T=\emptyset$ .
(14)
For a game $v$ and $x\in X^{*}(v)$ , let $(N\backslash \{n\},w)$ be a game defined by (14). If $x_{i}=\varphi:(w)$ for $i\neq n$ ,
then $x_{i}=\varphi_{i}(v)$ for all $i\in N$ , that is, $x$ is the Shapley value.
Example 2. Let $n=4$ . For a game $v$ and $x\in X^{*}(v)$ , define a game $(\{1,2,3\},w)$ by
$w(123)=x(123)$ ,
$w(ij)= \frac{1}{3}v(ij)+\frac{2}{3}\{v(ij4)-x_{4}\},\forall i,j\in N\backslash \{4\},$ $i\neq j$ ,
$w(i)= \frac{2}{3}v(i)+\frac{1}{3}\{v(i4)-x_{4}\},\forall i\neq 4$.
If $x_{i}=\varphi_{i}(w)$ for $i\neq 4$ , then $x_{f}=\varphi_{i}(v)$ for all $i$ .
3. An Intermediate Solution
In this section we define a solution and examines its properties. For $0\leq\alpha\leq 1,$ $x\in R^{N}$ and
$S\subseteq N$ , define
$h(S,x) \equiv\alpha e(S,x)+(1-\alpha)\max\{\sum_{T:i\in T\neq N}i\in S\gamma_{\iota-1},(T)e(T,x)\}$
.
We consider a variation of the prenucleolus for $(N,v)$ where the excess is replaced by $h(\bullet,.)$ .
We call this variation the $h$ -prenucleolus.
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Interpretation. $h(S,x)$ is a weighted sum of the usual excess and the maximum of averages
of excesses for all members in the coalition. If $\alpha=1$ , the solution is the prenucleolus. If
$\alpha=0$ , the solution is the Shapley value. The variation is an intermediate solution between
the prenucleolus and the Shapley value.
Theorem 2. For a fixed $0\leq\alpha\leq 1$ , the $h$ -prenucleolus is nonempty and consists of one
point. If $\alpha=0$ it is the Shapley value, while if $\alpha=1$ , it is the prenucleolus.
Lemma $2\mathrm{A}$ . For every $T\subseteq N,$ $h(T,x)$ is continuous and convex with respect to $x\in X^{*}(v)$ .
Proof: Let
$f_{i}(x)= \sum_{T:\iota\in T\neq N}\gamma_{n-1}(T)e(T,x)$ .
For $0\leq r\leq 1$ ,
$e(T, rx+(1-r)y)=re(T, x)+(1-r)e(T, y)$ .
So, we have $f_{i}(rx+(1-r)y)=rf_{i}(x)+(1-r)f_{i}(y)$ . From this and definition,
$rh(T,x)+(1-r)h(T, y)=\alpha re(T, x)+\alpha(1-r)e(T, y)$
$+(1- \alpha)r\max_{\iota\in T}\{f_{i}(x)\}+(1-\alpha)r\max_{i\in T}\{f_{i}(y)\}$
$\geq\alpha e(T,rx+(1-r)y)+(1-\alpha)\max_{i\in T}\{rf_{i}(x)+(1-r)f_{1}(y)\}$
$= \alpha e(T, \mathrm{r}x+(1-r)\mathrm{y})+(1-\alpha)\max_{i\in T}\{f_{i}(rx+(1-r)y)\}$
$=h(T,rx+(1-r)y)$ .
Hence $h(T,x)$ is convex. It is continuous by definition.
The next two lemmas are from [$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{g}/\mathrm{S}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ 2003, $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{p}$ . pp.108-112].
Lemma $2\mathrm{B}$ . If $X\neq\emptyset$ , compact and if $h_{i},i\in D$ are continuous, then $N(H,X)\neq\emptyset$ .
Lemma $2\mathrm{C}$ . Assume that $X$ is convex and all $h_{i},i\in D$ are convex. Then $N(H,X)$ is convex.
Furthermore, if $x,y\in N(H,X)$ , then $h_{i}(x)=h_{i}(y)$ for all $i\in D$ .
Proof of the theorem: For $x^{*}=( \frac{v(N)}{n}, \ldots, \frac{v(N)}{n})$ , let $q \equiv\max\{h(T,x") : T\neq\emptyset\}$ . There
exists $K$ such that for every $i\in N,$ $h(\{i\},x)\geq q$ if $x_{i}\leq K$ . So we need to consider points
in $Y\equiv\{y\in X^{*}(v):y_{i}\geq K,\forall i\in N\}$ . Hence by Lemma $2\mathrm{B}$ , the $h$-pre-nucleolus is nonempty.
ffirthermore, $Y$ is convex, and so by Lemma $2\mathrm{C}$ and Lemma $2\mathrm{A}$ , we have that $Y$ is convex
and, if $x$ and $y$ are in the $h$ -pre-nucleolus, then $h(S,x)=h(S,y)$ for all $S\subseteq N$ . In particular,
$h(\{i\},x)=h(\{i\},y)$ for all $i\in N$ . This implies $x_{i}=y_{i}$ for all $i\in N$ . $\square$






For $0\leq\alpha\leq 1,x\in R^{N}$ and $i\in S\subseteq N,$ dePne
$h(S,i,x,v)\equiv\alpha e(S,x)+(1-\alpha)(l_{i}(v)-x_{i})$ .
Definition. Let $v$ be a game. For $x\in X^{*}(v)$ and $\beta$ , let
$D(\beta, x, v)\equiv\{(S, i).‘ i\in S, h(S, i, x, v)\geq\beta\}$ .
A vector $x\in X^{*}(v)$ has $h$ -property I with respect to $v$ if for all $\beta$ such that $D(\beta,x,v)\neq\emptyset$ : If
$y\in R^{N}$ satisfies $y(N)=0$ and $\alpha y(S)+(1-\alpha)y_{i}\geq 0$ for all $(S,i)\in D(\beta,x,v)$ , then $\alpha y(S)+(1-\alpha)y_{i}=0$
for all $(S,i)\in D(\beta,x,v)$ .
Theorem 3. For a game $v$ and $x\in X^{*}(v),$ $x$ is the $h$ -prenucleolus if and only if $x$ has
$h$ -property I.
Proof: Necessity. Assume $x$ is the $h$-prenucleolus. Let $\beta$ satisfy $D(\beta,x,v)\neq\emptyset$ and let $y\in R^{N}$
satisfy $y(N)=0$ and $\alpha y(S)+(1-\alpha)y_{i}\geq 0$ for all $(S,i)\in D(\beta,x,v)$ . Define $z_{\epsilon}=x+\epsilon y$ for $\epsilon>0$ .
Then $z_{\epsilon}\in X^{*}(v)$ . Choose $\epsilon^{*}>0$ such that, for all $(S,i)\in D(\beta,x,v)$ and all $T\in 2^{N}\backslash D(\beta,x,v)$ ,
$h(S, i, z_{e}\cdot,v)>h(T, i, z_{\epsilon}\cdot, v)$ . (15)
For every $(S,i)\in D(\beta,x,v)$ ,
$h(S, i, z_{\epsilon}\cdot, v)=\alpha e(S, z_{\epsilon}\cdot)+(1-\alpha)(\ell_{i}(v)-z_{\epsilon}\cdot)$
$=\alpha(e(S, x)-\epsilon^{*}y(S))+(1-\alpha)(\ell_{\iota’}(v)-x_{i}-\epsilon^{*}y_{i})$
(16)
$=h(S, i, x, v)-\epsilon^{*}(\alpha y(S)+(1-\alpha)y_{i})$
$\leq h(S,i,x,v)$ .
Assume, on the contrary, that there is $(S,i)\in D(\beta, x,v)$ such that $\alpha y(S)+(1-\alpha)y_{i}>0$ . By (15)
and (16), we obtain $\theta(x)>_{l\mathrm{e}x}\theta(z_{\epsilon}\cdot)$ , which is a contradiction.
Sufficiency. Let $x\in X^{*}(v)$ have $h$ -property I and let $z$ be the $h$-prenucleolus. Denote
$\{h(S,i,x,v):(S,i)\}=\{\beta_{1}, \ldots,\beta_{p}\}$ ,
where $\beta_{1}>...$ $>\beta_{\mathrm{p}}$ . Define $y=z-x$ . Then $y(N)=0$ . Also, since $\theta(x)>_{\mathrm{t}ex}\theta(z)$ , if $(S,i)\in$
$D(\beta_{1},x,v)$ , then $h(S,i,x,v)=\beta_{1}\geq h(S,i,z,v)$ . Hence
$h(S.i, x,v)-h(S, i, z, v)=\alpha y(S)+(1-\alpha)y_{2}\geq 0$ .
Therefore, by assumption, $\alpha y(S)+(1-\alpha)y_{i}=0$ for all $(S,i)\in D(\beta_{1},x,v)$ . Assume now that
$\alpha y(S)+(1-\alpha)y_{i}=0$ for all $(S,i)\in D(\beta_{t},x,v)$ for some $1\leq t<p$ . Then, since $\theta(x)>_{\mathrm{t}ex}\theta(z)$ ,
$h(S, i, x,v)=\beta_{t+1}\geq h(S,i, z, v),\forall(S, i)\in D(\beta_{t+1}, x, v)\backslash D(\beta_{t}, x,v)$ .
Hence $\alpha y(S)+(1-\alpha)y_{i}\geq 0$ for all $(S,i)\in D(\beta t+\iota,x,v)$ . Again, by assumption, $\alpha y(S)+(1-\alpha)y_{i}=0$
for all $(S,i)\in D(\beta_{t+1},x,v)$ . We conclude that $\alpha y(S)+(1-\alpha)y_{1}=0$ for all $(S,i)$ . Hence, $y=0$ and
$x=z$ . $\square$
Example 3. Let $n=3$ , and
$v(1)=v(2)=v(3)=0,$ $v(12)=3,$ $v(13)=5,$ $v(23)=7,$ $v(N)=10$ .
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The prenucleolus for this game is
$( \frac{3}{2}, \frac{13}{4}, \frac{21}{4})$ .
The Shapley value for this game is
$h(S,x)=\{$
$-x_{1}+\alpha-1$ , if $S=\{1\}$ ;
$-x_{2}$ , if $S=\{2\}$ ;
$-x_{3}-\alpha+-1$ , if $S=\{3\}$ ;
$\alpha(3-x_{1}-x_{2})+(1-\alpha)\max\{-1-x_{1}, -x_{2}\}$ , if $S=\{1,2\}$ ;
$\alpha(5-x_{1}-x_{3})+(1-\alpha)\max\{-x_{2},1-x_{3}\}$ , if $S=\{1,3\}$ ;
$\alpha(7-x_{2}-x_{3})+(1-\alpha)\max\{-x_{2},1-x_{3}\}$ , if $S=\{1,2\}$ .
Both of the Shapley value and the prenucleolus satisfy
$x_{3}\geq x_{2}+1$ , and $x_{2}\geq x_{1}+1,x\in X^{*}(v)$ . (17)
We will find the solution for the region in $X^{*}(v)$ which is defined by (17). First we see
$h(\{2\},x)=-x_{2}\leq-x_{1}-1\leq h(\{1\},x)$ ,
$h(\{3\}, x)=-x_{3}+1-\alpha\leq-x_{2}-1+1-\alpha\leq h(\{2\}, x)\leq h(\{1\},x)$ ,
$h(\{1,2\}, x)=h(\{1\}, x)+\alpha(3-x_{2})$ ,
$h(\{1,3\}, x)=h(\{1\}, x)+\alpha(5-x_{3})$ ,
$h(\{2,3\}, x)=\alpha(7-x_{3})-x_{2}\leq\alpha(7-x_{3})+h(\{1\}, x)$ .
Case 1: $x_{2}\leq 3$ .
This implies $x_{1}\leq 2$ and $x_{1}+x_{3}\geq 7$ and so $x_{3}\geq 5$ . Hence $h(\{1,2\},x)\geq h(\{1\},x)\geq h(\{1,3\},x)$ . So
we need to compare $h(\{1,2\},x)$ with $h(\{2,3\},x)$ .
$h(\{1,2\}, x)\geq h(\{2,3\}, x)\Leftrightarrow(1-\alpha)x_{2}+\alpha x_{3}-x_{1}\geq 3\alpha+1$ .
The line $h(\{1,2\},x)\geq h(\{2,3\},x)$ in $X^{*}(v)$ has common points
$( \frac{5}{3}, \frac{8}{3}, \frac{17}{3})$ and $(1+ \frac{1}{1+\alpha}, 3,5+\frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha})$
with lines $x_{2}=x_{1}+1$ and $x_{2}=3$ respectively. Since $h(\{1,2\},x)$ is a linear function and
$h( \{1,2\}, (\frac{5}{3}, \frac{8}{3}, \frac{17}{3}))>h(\{1,2\}, (1+\frac{1}{1+\alpha}, 3,5+\frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha}))$ ,
we conclude that the point $(1+ \frac{1}{1+\alpha},3,5+\frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha})$ minimizes $h(\{1,3\},.)$ in the segment connecting
these two points. Also in the segment connecting
(2, 3, 5) and $(1+ \frac{1}{1+\alpha}, 3,5+\frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha})$ ,
we see that $(1.+ \frac{1}{1+\alpha},3,5+\frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha})$ minimizes $h(\{2,3\}, .)$ .
Case 2: $x_{2}\geq 3,x_{3}\geq 5$ and $x_{3}\geq x_{2}+1$ .
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We have $h(\{1,2\}, x)\leq h(\{1\},x)$ and $h(\{1_{i}3\},x)\leq h(\{1\}, x)$ . So we need to compare $h(\{1\},x)$ with
$h(\{2,3\},x)$ .
$h(\{1\},x)\geq l\iota(\{2,3\},x)\Leftrightarrow x_{2}+\alpha x_{3}-x_{1}\geq 6\alpha+1$ .
The line $x_{2}+\alpha x_{3}-x_{1}=6\alpha+1$ has common points
$(1+ \frac{1}{1+\alpha},3,5+\frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha})$ and $(2- \frac{\alpha}{2},3+\frac{\alpha}{2},5)$
with lines $x_{2}=3$ and $x_{3}=5$ respectively. In the segment defined by these two points, the
latter minimizes $h(\{1\}, .)$ .
Case 3: $x_{3}\leq 5$ and , $x_{3}\geq x_{2}+1$ .
These imply $x_{2}\geq 3$ . We have $h(\{1,3\},x)$ with $h(\{1\},x)$ and $h(\{1\},x)\geq h(\{1,2\},x)$ . So we need
to compare $h(\{1,3\},x)$ with $h(\{2,3\},x)$ .
$h(\{1,3\},x)\geq h(\{2,3\},x)\Leftrightarrow x_{2}\geq x_{1}+\alpha+1$ .
The line $x_{2}=x_{1}+\alpha+1$ has common points
$( \frac{7}{3}-\frac{2\alpha}{3}, \frac{10}{3}+\frac{\alpha}{3}, \frac{13}{3}+\frac{\alpha}{3})$ and $(2- \frac{\alpha}{2},3+\frac{\alpha}{2},5)$
with lines $x_{3}=x_{2}+1$ and $x_{3}=5$ respectively. In the segment defined by these two points, the
latter minimizes $h(\{1,3\},.)$ if $\alpha\geq\frac{1}{2}$ and the former minimizes if $\alpha\leq\frac{1}{2}$ . When $\alpha=\frac{1}{2}$ , all points
in the segment minimize $h(\{1,3\}, .)$ .
Summarizing the three cases, we see that the chosen point is
$\{$
$a:( \frac{7}{3}-_{T’ 7}2\alpha\frac{10}{3}+^{\alpha}, \frac{13}{3}+\frac{\alpha}{3})$ , if $\alpha\leq\frac{1}{2}$ ;
$b:(2- \frac{\alpha}{2},3+\frac{\alpha}{2},5)$ , if $\alpha\geq\frac{1}{2}$ .
As $\alphaarrow 0$ , the point $a$ converges to the Shapley value, while, as $\alphaarrow 1$ , the point $b$ converges
to $( \frac{3}{2}, \frac{7}{2},5)$ , which is not the prenucleolus. When $\alpha=1$ , all points in the segment connecting
$( \frac{3}{2}, \frac{7}{2},5)$ and $( \frac{3}{2},3, \frac{11}{2})$ are candidates, and the midpoint of this segment minimizes the third-
largest element of $h(\cdot,.)’ \mathrm{s}$ . This midpoint is the prenucleolus.
4. Concluding Remarks.
We defined a solution for TU games and showed that the proposed solution is nonempty
and consists of one point. It is a bridge between the Shapley value and the prenucleolus. It
remains to characterize it axiomatically.
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